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ABSTRACT 
A significant probleAI in radioactive waste fac11tty siting is that apparent SIIIall risks or minor risks events 
produce substantfal public concern and sochl impacts. The reasol's for this difference in public health and soci-
etal impacts is not well understood. This paper explores the issues involved in the socIal iJIIpltfIcat10n of r1sk, 
using the rIsk associated wtth site characterization as the exanple. Noteworthy as sources of anpl1ftcation are 
the infomation flow associated with risks and risk events fncluding the large voltJlle of information, the extent 
of dispute, lind mfslnfonnation and rumor. Such fnformation passes throu!fI the mass media and fnterpersonal net-
works. The rDajor mechanisms involved in risk i!I1Iplffications a.re discussed and their Hkely ;mpacts on society 
described. 
Radioact1ve waste facll1ty Siting, It 1$ increas-
ingly clear, belongs to a special class of teChnologi-
cal and public policy problf!llls. S1t1ng hazardous 
facilities, whether oil refineries, hazardous wastes, 
or nuclear power plants, has becollle one of the IIDSt 
difficult aspects of technology deployment. Whfle the 
·backyards· problem has long been the bane of siting 
prIsons, half-way houses, and town -dumps,- radioactive 
waste faciltties apparently fntroduce new dimensions of 
concern and difficulty. The conf1guration of the prob-
lem includes: 
a new and untried teChnological system 
• substantial equity ancl value issues 
• uncertain risks 
high levels of publ1c concern and fear 
intense media attention 
• differing expert and publ1c assessments of 
r15k 
struggles over control of decls10ns 
Compl1cating this situation are the limitations in the 
existing fields of appl1ed analys1s 1n lnternaltzing 
the scope of issues into existing analytic structures. 
No Single field of inquIry fs well equipped to engage 
such an lntr1nsically interdisciplinary set of ques-
tions. Social lmpact assesSlllent has traditionally 
focussed upon the corrmunity impacts typically asso-
ciated with the introduction of industrial facilit1es 
into small, rural cOlllllunltfes. The approadl has 
~enerally conceptualized the natun! of illlpacts as 
strongly related to (1) the nature of the project or 
facl11ty. (2) the m.lllber and characteristics of new 
fn-mfgrants, and (3) the nature of the host community. 
While the field has recognized that r1sk-related 
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illlpacts do not fit this traditional schema and have 
designated them as ·special impacts" (suggesting that 
they fall outside existing analytic approaches), exist-
ing conceptual structures offer few insights into their 
epidemiology, sources, and management options. For lts 
part, the field of risk assessment has generally empha-
sized public health and (perhaps) econOllIc impacts of 
potential risk events associated w1th technologies or 
part icul ar facill ties. Although researchers have made 
illportant strides 1n relating such risks to publtc 
perceptions and response, the broader linkage to social 
impacts and potential managetlent systems has generally 
yet to be conceptualized . 
In this paper, we examine one of the more diff1-
cult problems tnvolved with radioactive waste raanage-
ment. namely the tendency for apparently minor r1sks 
am risk events to generate h1~ levels of public 
concern and associated $Octal impacts seemingly out of 
proportion to their public health or envirol11lental 
stgnificance . OUr intent 1s (1) to clarify the nature 
of this problem, and (2) to introduce an overall con-
ceptualization, ~ich we term the soc1al am~ificatlon 
of risk, to suggest d1fferent processes iIih\ are at 
work. 
RADIOACTIVE WASTE RISKS 
The major risks associated with a high. level 
nuclear waste repository can be ~ouped into five lllajor 
clusters: 
(1) initial 
~:::;d::: the health 
'"t~seq"!'"t stages, Is also not risk-free. 
In particular. test drilling and underground 
studies pose some l1m1ted envirOl11lental risks, 
while operational iII'Id transportation K:cidents 
pose other riSk possibllitles. These, and the 
potential presence of limited cnounts of 
radioactive tracers or experl~ntal ~aterials. 
have potential (or events which ~~ affect publIc 
perceptions and generate broader sochl Impacts. 
(2) ~~8~rf:~:Tf:',lansportatlon risks should for a number of reasons. 
the planning of the hu-
system and logistics 
has rece1ved detalle:f attention by the DOE. 
Since transportation may be either by ran or 
truck Mde to a reposttory stte and sInce these 
modes Involve different tr~sportatlon risks (wIth 
rail generally bel1eved to pose the lower overall 
risk but a higher IoOrst case event risk). the 
design of modal transport is significant. A ""trI-
ber of Issues have been raised about radioactive 
waste .canisters, fncluding quality assurance 
deficiencies, undue reliance upon cask Integrtty. 
inadequate regulatory inspection and illlplementa-
tion. inlldeqUICies In nate 81Iergency response 
capabilities. and lil1lltations In the desl!PI of 
tests for assessing cask performance. Further-
more. the data base concerning low probabili-
ty/severe accidents events Is limited (particular-
ly for ral1) so that uncert&lntles exht In 
estimating this set of risks of greatest concern. 
Flna.lly. even If serious accidents with radfo-
active releases do not occur. Incidents Involving 
less serious accidents lIIay nonetheless have seri-
ous and wIdespread repercussions on ec:OnOlay and 
public response. 
(3) repository pre-closure risks. AccIdents may be 
expected to occur In the above-ground activities 
At the repository during both construction and 
operation phases. Construction risks ""ll tend to 
resl!lltlle those of ather large Industrial and lIin-
lng operations. since radiological hazards will 
not be present. Particularly close attention 
should be given to preclosure accidents involvlng 
the ootential for radioactive releases. with expo-
sure possible to both workers and the publfc. A 
variety of accident scenarios has been identified 
and assurance Is needed that the scenarios ade-
quately bound the range of \lecldents which III4Y 
occur. Potential radioactive releases also need 
to be related to local weather conditions to 
assess whether the projected off-site rl sks are 
sufficiently conservative . 
(') 
ers. The 
of so-called fissfon product 
perhaps 500-100 years into the future. and the Nch 
longer tenn ilCtlnlde-d~lnated hazard period. 
SinCe risks to both nearby and distant future gen-
erations are Involved. important equity considera-
ttons are present 'IIlich have relevance for both 
risk lIIanagetient designs and lIIitigatlon aOO c(Jllpen-
sat Ion plannfng. Specific issues of long-ter. 
risk which lItust be addressed include: 
• the potent hI for natural catastrophic events 
and their poss1ble IlIIpacts upon a repository 
over very long periods of tf.e 
the sufficiency of the scientific data base 
concerning heat and radiation Impacts upon 
long-tena repository performance 
• the soundness of estfllates of the risks asso-
ciated with purposeful future human intrusion 
frOll resource exploration and ways to warn 
future generations If knowledge 1s lost 
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(5) retrieval risks . The potential al~ays exists. 
in light of the 50-year retrtevabt11ty requirement 
for the repository. that the \IIastes lIIi!IY need to be 
retrieved. Such a situation would necessarily 
pose ri sks. to the workers InvolVed In retrieval. 
to nearby publics. ard (perhaps) to the environ-
ment . These risks have received limtted attention 
as yet but need to be carefully assessed. 
THE RISKS CF SITE CHARACTERIZATION 
Site characterization refers to the prograft of 
exploration and research, both in the laboratory and In 
the field. that ~Ill be undertaken to establish the 
geologiC conditions and the ranges of the parameters of 
a particular candidate stte. relevant to the procedures 
under 10 CFR Part 960. The bortngs. surface excava-
tions. shaft excavatlon. and other in·sltu testing at 
depth needed to detennine the sultabflity of the site 
for repository will be done pursuant to a detailed 
site-characterization plAn. The U.S. Department of 
Energy (OOE 1985) develope:l the specifications of what 
the plan IIkIst include. 
The Yucca Mountafn ffnal 
Nent (see DOE 1986a, 4-1 to 
"iiiO'"envirornental mnltoring IIIttigatlon plans 
site characterization (In: 19S6b. 1986C) suggest a key 
set of activities and dAta surmartzing s1te characteri-
zation at Yucca Mountain: 
two shafts (one 12 feet In dIameter; the 
other 6 feet) to be drilled. with undergroood 
drifts 
• 29 deep drill holes 
244 shallow drill holes 
ACcess roads to each drill pad 
20 trenches 
off-road vehicle travel 
20 acres cleared for surface facilities; 
605-680 acres to have sol Is disturbed 
• rock-storage pile to accClllllodate 1.3 mn 110n 
cubic feet of mined rock 
• underground blast1ng 
potential release of naturally occurring 
radlonucl1des aOO resuspensfon of radioactive 
materials previously deposited durIng atmo-
spheric test1ng At the Nevada Test Site 
• use of radioactive tracers and shielded 
sources 
• reclMJatfon activities 
a peak workforce of 690 direct an:! indlred 
workers (40% direct) 
60 additional worker vehicles between 5-6 
p.m. dally Me:! one truck shipment per day on 
U.S. 95 
• time duration: 55 lIonths 
Charactertsttcally. risks, such as those rI stte 
characterhatton, are identified, through analogous 
activity or fault tree analys1s. by types of events 
~Jch lllay reasonably be expected to occur. and by 
estimation of the public health and I'!nvfronllental COO-
sequences ltkely to be assocIated with the events. 
SQletf~es. depending upon the lmlglnltlon of the 
analyst and the ctlllpleteness of the ISsesSIIIetlt. highly 
unlikely events or combln.tlon of events -.y be In-
cluded. Typically. the risks .~ stated In broad 
outline, usually vlth ~erical estl~ates of select~d 
expected consequences over the period of the activity 
or facility perfo~ance. Consider. for example. the 
U.S. Depar~ent of Energy's AssesSlllent of the major 
l~pacts of site characterIzation risks at the Yucca 
Hountain site, which it estimates In Its ftnal Envl-
ronment,l Assessment (ODE 1986, 4-22 to 4-39) as • 
Involving: 
reaoval af vtldl1fe habitat (705 acres of 
habitat wfll be dIsturbed). The consequences 
wfll be Of particular note for the desert 
tortoise and "oj.ve fishhook CICtus which mly 
become additions to the LIst of Endlllgered m 
Threatened Species. A density of less than 20 
tortoIse burrows per Square mfle suggests 
potential disturbance of up to 20 burrows over 
the 705 leres of disturbed habitat. 
Increased potential for range fires due to 
increased hufllan acthity /II'Id off-road driving 
• IIlnor parttculate and gaseous aIr pollution 
0.13 death and 14 worker Injuries over 55 
1II0nths due to excavation of exploratory shafts 
potential exposure to naturally occurring 
radlonuclldes and to resuspenslon of radlo-
.ethe fallout frOll! atl1lOspherlC testing of 
nuclear weapons 
• potential worker exposure to radioactive 
tracers 
• disturbance of cultural resources at. four sites 
eligIble for naalnatlon to the Hatlonal Reg1s-
,,, 
• small to Insignlfh:ant sochl lIld P.tOnollltc 
impacts 
This rhk assessllent, we hasten to OKId. is quite char-
acteristIc ·of what prevafls In environmental assess-
lIents, but stIll provides ren!arkabl;v little Insight 
into the scope of consequences 'lfh tch l'I\iI)' occur and even 
less about the SOcIal Significance of the risks of site 
characterization. This is because it neglects the 
broad Interaction between risk and tts sochl settings. 
Speclfic.11y it n:dsses: 
• the au1ttdiL'/lenslonal (ATld especially qualfta-
tlve) aspects of risk 
• secondary (and SCJIIe primary) consequences 
(e.g., stress, an~fety) 
interaction between publfc concern Itld risk 
events 
Significant risk ~ (as opposed to conse-
quences) 
• the effects of s@<!uences of events as opposed 
to stngle events 
• fetdbaclr: to risk frDIII soct., SO\Jrtes 
• social contributors and co-contrtbutors to 
accidents 
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• the issues posed by dl fferences In expert and 
publIc asse5S11ent of risk 
tHE SOCIAL AMPLIFICATIOH OF RISK 
The need for completeness In risk assess~nt 
delll,nds that Mal,sis IIIdress 110" risk fI1d r1sk eyents 
produce associated sochl Impacts which either substan-
thlly exceed the health sa.fety effect or 
whtch act to term this 
process the In the 
discussion which appar-
ently SIIIall events may anpl1fled Into 
larger social and public concerns, usi~ site 
characteriutfon for a hfgh-level radioactive "ute 
repository AS OLD" e~illple. 
Sources 
The roots of social .nplfflcation of risk l1e 1n 
the expertence of risk, particularly in direct personal 
experience and In more indirect. or secondary, experi-
ence through information received about the risk, risk 
events, and management systems. Direct &perience with 
rfsky activities or events can be either reassuring, as 
with aJtomobfle drIving, or alannfng. as vith tornadoes 
or floods. Generally, expertence with drll1latic acci-
dents or risk events tncreases the memorabfHty of the 
hazard, thereby ltkely heightening the perceptIon of 
risk. But direct experience can also provide repeated 
feedback on the nature, extent, and manageabl1lty of 
the hazard. affording greater perspecttve and capabili-
ty for avoldfng rtsks. This ts typically the case with 
occupational hazards, for exlllple. "fltle d1rect exper-
Ience can serve as a r1sk emplifier. 'It undoubtedly 
also acts to restra1n iIIplfflcatfon . IkIderstandlng 
thIs interaction for different risks and different 
experiences is a continuing research "eed. 
Where d1rect personal experfence is lacking or 
minimal. fndividuals learn about risk frail others. 
Information flow bec~es a k~ ingredient in public 
perceptions and attitudes. Key attributes of infonua-
tion which Influence the social anplffication of risk 
are vol~e. the degree to Which Infonaatlon Is dfs-
~ited. ana the extent of euggeration or IIhint'Oriiia-
-'!!!.. 
Independent of the accuracy and partIcular content 
of Infonnatlon, large volume of information flow may 
serve as a risk mlpHfter. This occurs for several 
reasons. In an analysis of media covera!Jl! of Love 
Canal and Three Hile Island, Mazur (1964) argues that 
the massfve quantity of media coverage not only 
reported the events but defined and Shaped the issues. 
Repeated stories, of course, direct public attention to 
particular risk problems and ala:J froo c~petlng 
sources of attention. Horeover. the /IIedia tend to 
become the battleground Where various partiCipants 
compete for advanta9l!. However balanced the coverage, 
it Is Ulclear that reassuring chlms can effecttvely 
counter the effects of fear-arousing messages. In 
Alvin Weinberg's lletaphor, it is IllUch harder to 
·unscare- people than to scare them. The second reason 
Hes in Individual rhl:: perception. High volOOles of 
infOmlatton lIobillze latent fears about a particular 
risk and Increase the recall of previous accidents or 
management failures or enlarge the extent to which 
particular fanures, events, 0'1'" consequences can be 
llDagined. In this way, technologies or activities may 
COllll! to be vfewed as IIIlre dangerous. 
The: second attribute of fnfonnation is the degree 
to Which factual information or inferences are disputed 
by Individuals or organizatfons regarded as credIble by 
interested nuftlers of the publ1c. Deba.tes nang 
experts 9 1t Is now c1ear9 tend to increase public 
uncertainty lbout what the facts are, Increase doubts 
about ~ether the hazards are really understood. and 
lIIay decrease the credibility of official spokespersons 
(Mazur 1981). If the risks are already feared by the 
public. then increased concern Is the likely resu\~. 
Exaggerated or erroneous Infonlation is undoubted-
ly a p~rful source of amplification. The report 
during the Three Mile Island acc1dent that a hydrogen 
bubble Inside the reactor could explode 'ltlthln the next 
two days. blow the head off the reactor 9 and release 
radioactive material Into the atmosphere certainly 
Increased public fears around the Nlclear plant . Simi-
larly the accounts In sore newspapers, following the 
Chernobyl accident, of -Thousands Dead,l- Increased the 
1118110rablllty of that accident and the perceived cata-
strophic potent i a1 of nt.Ic1 ear power. If erroneous 
fnfonnatlon sources floo ready access to the lIasS lIIedfa 
without effective antidotes, then large soctal Impacts, 
for even minor events. becone entirely possible. 
Channels 
Information <1ilout risk and risk events flows 
through two major communications network--the mass 
media and more Informal Interpersonal linkages. The 
mass media as risk articulators have received the bulk 
of scientific attention for their obvious role In pub-_ 
Hc opinion fonnatlon and cOll1'l1unity agenda setting. 
Since It is impossible for public to gain knowledge 
directly for ~ost hazardous technologies. It Is very 
dependent upon the portrayal of risk management that It 
sees daily In the lIIass media. Since the media tend to 
cover dl sproport lonate Iy rare or dramat Ic rf sks, or 
risk events, tt is nat surprfsing that people's esti-
mates of the principal causes of death are related to 
the lIIIOunt of media coverage they recelve_ Moreover. 
cont@nt studies of risk portrayal in the media reveal 
considerable III1s1nfonnation and distortion (Combs and 
Slovlc 1979. Freimuth, Greenberg, DeWitt and Romano 
1984). 
Informal network of communications involve the 
linkages that exist among friends. neighbors. and 
co-workers and within broader social !J(oups IIDre 
generally. While relatively little is known aboLSt such 
communication networks, it is undoubtedly the case that 
people do not consider risk Issues In Isolation . If 
they are matters of concern, individuals will usually 
discuss then 'ltith others In their social networks. 
Slnce these friends and co-workers w111 tend to be 
laypersons wtthoLSt particular expertise, the potential 
for the Introduction of erroneous or exaggerated Infor-
mation Is high. Also, ff the risk event Is drll1latfc or 
the risk feared, rumor NY be a significant ele.ent In 
perception fonnatlon. Moreover, since one's social 
group may share a particular cultural bias, or view of 
the world, particular attitudes or Interpretations may 
be reinforced and integrated into larger frReS of 
analysis. it should be expected that suCh interperson-
al networks may lead to divergent risk Interpretations 
and levels of concern. 
Mechanisms 
Social amplification of risk occurs In different 
ways aoo at different levels . First fnformat fon flow. 
particularly if In large volume or containing exaggera-
tion or distortion, m~ he'lhten the Individual's 
perception of risk. This w 11 occur prinCipally 
through the auf1abll1ty heuristic, making the rIsk 
more I8IOrable or imaginable. If the risk has qualfta-
t tve propertles--catastroph Ic potent I al. newness, 
etc.--which Increase public concern. then the 
amplification m~ be particularly large. 
enter into the 
(1981) tenns the 
• Th1s may 
because a part group has goals which 
include this rhk issue Of" simply because pol1tlcal 
advantage Is to be had by exploiting this particular 
risk or risk event . To the extent that risk becO'lles a 
central Issue in a political cilllpafgn or conflict among 
social groups, it will be vigorously brought to public 
attention, usually coupled with an interpretation. 
Indeed even Ideolo9Y, of the risk mana9en11!nt process . 
Polarization of Interpretation and escalation of 
rhetoric by the partisan are not (nfrequent results. 
He'It recruits are drawn Into the conflicts and soc1alw 
'fzed into the interrelation (Mazur 1981). These social 
al1gllllents tend to becorre anchors for subsequent inter-
pretation of risk management and III4y becOIIIe quite flrlll 
In the face of confllctlng information. 
. A third mechanism of npllf1catlon Is that the 
occurrence of particular events. with associate::! 
information, provides clues (What SOllIe would tern 
-s1gnals·) about the effectiveness of the management 
process. Relevant events may include those IIIIlch 
suggest either that a ne'lt risk has appeare::! or that the 
risk is Targer or different than previously lWIderstood. 
The Three Mfle IslaOO accident was an anlnous event not 
because of the radiation actually released ('IIf1lch Will.S 
small) but because It suggested that the technology was 
not suffiCiently understood to be lIanaged tldequately. 
Slovlc aOO colleagues have suggested (see Table 1) that 
accidents can be contrasted according to their high 
consequences on the one hand .In:! their- hlg, IMormie Ion 
TABLE I 
Accident Scenarios Designed to Vary In Jnfonnatlveness 
Low Informat10n Value 
Bus skids on Ice and runs off road (27 killed) 
Dam collapse (40 killed) 
Hundred-year tlood (2700 killedl 
Meteorite hits stadlum (4000 ki led} 
Two jl.l1lbo jets collide on runway (600 killed) 
Source: Slovic, F1schhoff, and lichtenstein 1986. 
High Information Value 
Nuclear reactor accident: Partial core meltdown 
releases radiation inside plant but not ClJtslde 
(1 "l1ed) 
Botulism in well-known brand of food (2 killed) 
New model auto steering fans (3 killed) 
Recombinant DNA workers contract 
mysterious illness (10 killed) 
Jet engine falls off on takeoff (300 killed) 
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(or -essage) value on the other. Risk events ~Ich 
tell soc\ety something It didn't knew previously about 
a hazard may produce a alch larger socld reaction than 
events with ",uch larger pUblic health or safety conse-
qUenceS. EVents WItch ACt as clues Iftay include occur-
rences outside the risk ·chalnN (events, ~posure. 
consequences) and In the risk management syst~. as' 
suggested by Table 2. The role that clues pl~ In 
public ISsesslQent of risk Is not cur~nt1y Wlderstood 
but "'~ constitute another ",ajor route by which people 
froal opinions mout risks and technologies. 
Stigmatization Is another. albeit II poorly under-
stood, mechanhm of ilIIlpl1flcatlon. Stl9'la refer to the 
negathe Imagery associated with particular soefal 
groups or Individuals. But areas or sites with hfgn 
pollution, waste accUlulatlon, or hazardous technology 
can cOllie to be assoc1ated with such images. Wastes are 
a particular Issue In such stfgma since they tend to 
share II number of different negative attributes. love 
Canal, the Valley of the Thousand Drlns, and the Ne."ada 
Test Slh all e'loke vIvid images of waste and pollu-
tion. Sfnce the typical human response to stigmatized 
areas Is .woldance, It Is reasonable to asSURll! that 
rhk or waste-Induced stigma may have significant 
social consequences. Particularly In areas where the 
Imagery of place or area, such as the desert enylron-
ment of Nevada or the lakes of Maine, Is a major part 
of Its economic base or qualIty of life, stigma fo~a­
tlon may take on substantial social and economic 
importance. Unfortunately, little Is known of the role 
of risk in creating sti9la, the extent of aversion 
which results, and how durable such stigma prove to 
be. 
A final mechanl~ of amplification Is positive 
feedback to the risk itself due: to sochl response to 
risk or r1sk event. If a transportat1on accident wtth 
radlOlctive wastes were to occur close to a repository 
site, for ex~ple, It is possible that protests and 
attempted blockage of the transportation route could 
occur. Such actions could themselves become initiating 
or co-initiating events In a future accident. Or an 
aceldent 1n waste-handl1l'1g at the fadlity could lead 
opponents, or disgruntled workers, to replicate the 
event through sabotabe. Given the strong possible 
concerns oyer lIIcertaln technologies or risk, a wide 
variety of lIIechanfSlllS exist which III~ add to the rfsk 
potential at the various stages In the development of 
the haurd. 
These different 1II!chanisms of sodal iJ1IpHflcatlon 
of risk can occur s1ngly or in combination; indeed they 
~ay be interactive . It is likely that the outcomes in 
many cases ,,111 greatly exceed the apparent public 
health or environmental consequences. 
CONCLUSIONS 
On the basts of the discussion above, we conclude 
that 
(1) the risks of site characterization wIll likely 
have IIlOre significant Impacts than those indicated 
by traditional sochl impact analysis or dsk 
analysis. 
(2) Apparent minor risk or risk events can have large 
sochl, econCdic, and 1nstitution Impacts through 
a process Which we term the social amplification 
of risk. 
(3) While the IDllponents and structure of social 
<IIIpl1ficatlon are yet to be deftned fully, It ts 
apparent that characterlstlcs of Information flow, 
the messages which events carry, and the filters 
and anpltfers 1II1ch exist at both individual and 
sochl group levels are involved. 
Our research group at CENTED (Clark University) Is now 
developing a fuller and more fonnal statement which 
conceptua1fzes and provides I!ltllllples of soefal mlpllfl-
cation of risk. 
TABLE It 
Events With Potentially High Value As Clues 
Events 
Resignation of regulators or corporate 
officials In -conscience" 
Media report of off-site IIlgratton at a 
hazardous waste site 
Scientific dispute over the validity of 
an epidemiological study 
Regulators state that the levels of 
containments in water supply 
Involve only very low rIsks 
., 
Message 
The managers are concealing the risks: 
they cannot be trusted 
The risk IIll1agers are not in control 
The experts don't I6Iderstand the risks 
The managers donlt care about the 
people who will be harned 
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